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Building on theories of motivated reasoning and reason-based choice, we propose that people 
interpret reasons for indulgence in a different light depending on how tempting behavior is. 
Experiment 1a and 1b find that the more tempting behavior is, the more people think a given 
reason (“it is a Tuesday”) is an acceptable reasons to indulge. Furthermore, we find that both 
recalled prior good behavior (Experiment 2a) and recall d prior frustrations (Experiment 2b) are 
interpreted as good reasons to indulge when confronted with tempting behavior. Finally, 
Experiment 3 replicates that people see a prior good deed (taking part in the studies) as a better 
reason for indulgence when the indulgence is more temp ing, which makes them more likely to 
actually choose an unhealthy food option. This process of temptation-based reasoning sheds new 
light on existing theories on how people deal with temptations, notably those on self-licensing, 
comfort buying, and comfort eating.   
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Temptation-Based Reasoning:  
When Tempted, Everything Becomes a (Better) Reason to Indulge 
A temptation is the strong urge to do or have something that also has negative 
consequences. Examples of temptations are unhealthy food when one is dieting, being flirted 
with when one is in a committed monogamous relationship, checking social media during 
working hours, and spending money on luxurious items while trying to save money for 
retirement. Temptations represent a self-control prblem, a conflict between wanting something 
while preferring to resist it at the same time (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991). Much is learned over 
the last decades about how self-control may operate (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; 
Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Fishbach, 2009; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), and how 
people construct reasons to justify their choice (Kunda, 1990; Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 
1993). We add to the literature by proposing that people will find the same reason a better reason 
when they are tempted to indulge.  
This reasoning builds on two main lines of research. First, people need reasons to justify 
their choices, both to themselves and to others (Batardi & Shafir, 2000; Shafir et al., 1993). 
According to this reason-based choice perspective on decision making, people are more likely to 
choose options that are easier to justify and explain to themselves and to others. Second, Kunda’s 
(1990) theory on motivated reasoning posits that people construct justifications so they can 
arrive at desirable conclusions. We’ll go deeper into the theory behind this in the next section, 
but for now wish to point out that this prior work is mainly focused on how people construct 
arguments in favor of one of the options (in reason-based choice) or the preferred option (in 
motivated reasoning).We predict that people will not only construct reasons differently, but also 




that the exact same reason for indulgence is interpreted in a different light, depending on how 
tempting the indulgence is.  
Reason-based choice. Reason-based choice theory (Bastardi & Shafir, 2000; Shafir et 
al., 1993) indicates that many real life decisions are not necessarily based on a rational 
calculation of costs and benefits of taking an action, but on finding reasons or justifications for 
one of the options. When one has sufficient reasons to choose one option over the other, a choice 
is made. The importance of seeing choice as a process resulting from a search for reasons, is that 
it can accommodate many effects that strict rational theory cannot explain. For example, options 
that are presented first tend to be preferred as people start searching for reasons to favor that 
option (Kardes & Kalyanaram, 1992), or when someone chooses to delay a choice this delay is 
later interpreted as a sign that one did not really like the option, which becomes a reason against 
choosing it (Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Gilovich, 2010). The basic premise in Shafir et al.’s 
reason-based choice framework is thus that when people choose between two options, they look 
for reasons to justify choosing one of the options. But, what if people already have an initial 
preference for one of the options? What would be the role of reasons? 
Motivated Reasoning. What if people already have a preference for one of the options? 
Kunda (1990) argues that people then still look for reasons to justify that choice, but in a rather 
biased way. People engage in motivated reasoning to selectively recall reasons in favor of the 
desired conclusion. Following up on this, research also finds that evidence presented in favor or 
against one’s preferred option is evaluated in a different light: when information is consistent 
with one’s ideas it is only processed superficially (and accepted), when it is inconsistent people 
engage in more thorough processing to check its validity (Jain & Maheswaran, 2000).  




Motivated reasoning occurs when people prefer to reach a certain conclusion. One 
domain in which this happens is that of temptations. Often, tempting indulgences have short-
term benefits (eating the burger for lunch, checking social media during work), and long-term 
disadvantages (weight gain, having to work longer to get the job finished). Stronger temptations 
reflect a stronger preference for the short-term option, and motivated reasoning to find reasons 
that allow indulgence become more likely. An example of this is that when consumers spend 
more effort in a loyalty campaign, they more easily choose (a tempting) hedonic luxury reward 
over a utilitarian one (Kivetz & Simonson, 2002). The reason is that people feel they need to 
earn a luxury, and that when more effort is put into the loyalty program this justification is easier 
to make. This confirms that people feel they need a justification to give in to a tempting option.  
Research by Cheema and Soman (2006) also indicates th t pending on hedonic, 
tempting experiences is easier when the spending ca also be classified as a utilitarian one 
because that provides a justification for the indulgence. For example, a dinner at a restaurant is a 
hedonic experience, but it could also be framed as utilitarian (one needs to eat after all). For 
expenses that can be fitted into multiple different mental accounts (e.g., food, pleasure, social 
event), it is easier to find a reason why spending o  it is acceptable, and indulgence becomes 
more likely. Again this shows when the situation allows ambiguous interpretation, it becomes 
easier to find a justification via motivated reasoning, which in turn makes people more likely to 
indulge. Following up on this, Poynor and Haws (2009) also find that people categorize items as 
a luxury or a necessity, depending on their consumption goal and dispositional tendency; if their 
goals are consistent they place more products in the category to more easily fulfill their goal. 
This again shows the effects of motivated reasoning as people categorize items in a way that 




makes it easiest for them to reach their desired goals. In other words, when people are tempted, 
they will look for ways to justify giving in to the temptation. 
The idea that the ‘temptingness’ of an option directly affects motivated reasoning finds 
some support in recent research by De Witt Huberts, Evers, and De Ridder (2014). In their 
research, female students rated the temptingness of a chocolate bar and indicated which of 30 
reasons from a list they would find a good reason to eat the chocolate bar (Study 1) or wrote 
down the reasons they could think of to eat it (Study 2). The more tempting the chocolate bar 
was to a participant, the more justifications the students picked from a given list or wrote down 
themselves. These results show a correlation between th  self-rated temptingness of behavior and 
the number of justifications people thought were reasonable reasons for indulgence. However, 
because there is no manipulation, self-selection might play a role and therefore the direction of 
the effect is not fully clear. To test our idea that people interpret reasons for indulgence in a 
different light when confronted with a temptation, it is therefore crucial to experimentally 
manipulate the temptingness of the temptation and subsequently measure how this influences 
participants’ reasoning processes. Furthermore, and most importantly, their research could also 
not answer the question whether people will find the exact same reason a better reason to 
indulge, when they are tempted. 
Temptation-based reasoning 
The work discussed so far show that people are biased to find reasons for what they want 
to do. We extend these different lines of research to t e field of temptations, and think that 
stronger temptations will lead to a stronger motivated reasoning. We believe that when people 
are tempted to display certain behaviors, they search for justifications and any reason may serve 
as one. Importantly, we do not only believe that peopl  who want to give in to temptation are 




more likely to find reasons (as theories on motivated reasoning and reson-based choice would 
predict), but, and this is where our contribution lies, we also expect that people regard a similar 
reason as more compelling when the temptation is stronger. Thus, we hypothesize that people 
would find a certain reason for giving in to temptation to be more acceptable when the 
temptation is stronger than when it is less strong.  
The present research aims to shed light on when people permit themselves to give in to 
temptations. We believe that the presence of a temptation can initiate a motivated reasoning 
process, where reasons become “better” when the temptation is stronger. This adds to existing 
work because, 1) it shows that people do not only search for reasons to reach a desired 
conclusion, but also think the same reason is more acc ptable if that allows them to reach a 
desired conclusion, and because 2) we manipulate the temptingness of possible indulgences, 
which allows us to establish the causal link as we propose it here.  
We first test in two experiments (1a and 1b) whether a given reason is interpreted as a 
better reason to indulge when one is more tempted to indulge. In two follow-up experiments we 
test whether in a more tempting situation people find the same self-generated reason (a prior 
good deed in Experiment 2a, a prior frustration in Experiment 2b) a better reason to indulge 
when the option is more tempting. Finally, in Experiment 3 we replicate the earlier findings, but 
now with a real choice between an apple and a tempting donut as the dependent variable.  
Experiment 1a. Interpreting provided reasons to check social media during working hours 
 In Experiment 1a, we investigated whether people find different reasons for checking 
social media on their personal smartphones during work more acceptable when there is a high 
temptation to check their smartphones. We manipulated temptation by showing pictures of a 
tempting smartphone screen with alerts and messages versus a less tempting smartphone screen 




without any alerts. A screen that displays that there are multiple messages waiting for you is 
more tempting, because it is a signal that there is n w and unknown information close by, which 
triggers curiosity (Loewenstein, 1994). As Loewenstin argues, curiosity leads to a strong urge to 
satisfy it, and the closer information is, the stronger the curiosity and the temptation to look for it 
will be. We expected that participants who saw the picture of a tempting smartphone screen 
would find various reasons to check their personal phones during work more acceptable than 
participants who saw the picture of a less tempting smartphone screen.  
Method 
 We first conducted a pretest including 109 participants (65 males and 44 females, Mage = 
32.11, SD = 10.54) to examine whether checking both phones during work time was regarded as 
equally undesirable1. In this pretest, participants imagined working for a company that restricts 
the use of personal phones and saw the picture of the tempting smartphone (n = 54) versus the 
less tempting smartphone (n = 55). Subsequently, they were asked whether they thought that 
checking the phone during working hours would break their company policy (1 = not at all, 7 = 
very much). The results showed that checking the non-tempting smartphone was regarded as 
equally undesirable behavior (M = 6.25, SD = 1.27) as checking the more tempting smartphone 
was (M = 6.22, SD = 1.61, t(107) = 0.12, p = .907). This indicates that for both phones peopl 
realize that checking it during work hours is a negative action.   
  Four hundred and ninety-two U.S. based participants completed our experiment on 
MTurk. We excluded participants who indicated that t ey did not own a smartphone (n = 34)2, 
leaving 458 participants (272 males and 186 females, Mage = 31.05, SD = 9.14) in our sample. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the Tempting Phone condition (n = 221) or to the Less 
                                                           
1 Data files of our studies can be found at osf.io/894n7 
2 When we included participants who did not own a smrtphone in the analyses, we found similar results. 




Tempting Phone condition (n = 237). Participants were exposed to one of the phone screen 
images (Figure 1) and read the following instructions: 
Your work company has a policy that restricts the us of personal phones; in principle 
you are not allowed to check or use your personal phone during working hours. This is a 
screenshot of your personal smartphone that you use for private purposes only. You do 
not receive any work-related messages on this phone.      
 
Next, participants were asked to indicate how temptd they would be to check their personal 
phone if their screen looked like the presented image (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
Subsequently, participants were asked to read four p tential reasons for checking this personal 
phone during work, and they indicated for each whether hey found this reason an “acceptable” 
reason (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). The four reasons were: “You feel very frustrated about 
something that happened today”, “The past few days, you have worked very hard; you are ahead 
of your working schedule”, “You performed a good dee  today, such as helping someone in 
need”, and “It is a Tuesday afternoon”.  
- INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE - 
Results 
  Participants in the Tempting Phone condition rated the phone screenshot as more 
tempting (M = 5.35, SD = 1.79) than participants in the Less Tempting Phone condition (M = 
4.08, SD = 2.05), t(456) = 7.03, p < .001, d = 0.66. Means, standard deviations, and the statistic l 
comparisons of the acceptability of reasons depending on the temptingness of the situation are 
displayed in Table 1. A MANOVA including all reasons demonstrated that participants in the 
Tempting Phone condition regarded the reasons as marginally more acceptable than participants 
in the Less Tempting Phone condition, Wilks λ (4, 453) = 0.918, p = .073, η² = .019. When 
analyzing the univariate results for each reason, we found that participants in the Tempting 




Phone condition regarded the frustration reason and the Tuesday afternoon reason as more 
acceptable reasons for checking their personal phones during work compared to participants in 
the Less Tempting Phone condition. There were no differences between conditions for the other 
two reasons. If we aggregate the acceptability of all four reasons into a general “reason 
acceptability”-score (α = .85), we see a significant effect of condition as well. For each reason 
separately (as well as when we combine the acceptability of the four reasons in one measure), the 
rated temptingness of the checking the phone strongly predicted reason acceptability (all β’s ≥ 
.27, t’s (456) ≥ 6.03, p’s < .001), suggesting that the more tempted people are, the more they 
think a given reason is a better one to give in to the temptation.  
- INSERT TABLE 1 HERE - 
Discussion 
 The findings of Experiment 1a show that the more tempt d people are to check their 
personal phone during work time, the more acceptable they find different reasons to check their 
phone. These findings are supportive of our hypothesis that people regard similar reasons as 
more compelling when the temptation is stronger. A possible reason why we did not find that all 
reasons were seen as more acceptable when the situation w s more tempting, was that the 
temptingness manipulation only had a moderate effect size on how tempting it was to check the 
phone (d = 0.66). If we expect that the difference in perceived temptingness created by our 
manipulation would predict how acceptable reasons are, the effect size of the temptingness 
manipulation on acceptability of reasons would, even with a perfect correlation of perceived 
temptingness with the acceptability of reasons, be constrained to that maximum effect size of d =
0.66. Given that the pattern of results we found in Experiment 1a is as we predicted, but the 




effect not is that strong (nor strongly significant), we wanted to replicate the initial findings. In 
Experiment 1b we attempted to create a stronger manipul tion of perceived temptingness. 
Experiment 1b. Interpreting provided reasons to consume a tasty hamburger 
  This experiment had two objectives. First, we aimed to investigate whether the findings 
from Experiment 1a applied more broadly and replicate it within another domain of temptations 
(unhealthy snacking instead of questionable work behavior). The second objective was to try to 
use a stronger manipulation of temptingness so we could better investigate the effects of 
perceived temptingness. We investigated whether the confrontation with a hedonic food 
temptation leads people to find various reasons for indulgence more acceptable. We manipulated 
temptation through showing pictures of a tempting burger versus a less tempting burger (see 
Figure 2). We expected that participants who saw the picture of the tempting burger found 
various reasons to consume this burger more acceptabl  than participants who saw the picture of 
the less tempting burger. In addition, we expected that the more tempted participants were by the 
pictures of the burger, the more acceptable they found different reasons to consume the burger.  
- INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE-  
 Method 
  We first conducted a pretest including 95 participants (56 males and 38 females (1 
unknown), Mage = 32.06, SD = 10.50) to examine whether eating both burgers was regarded 
equally undesirable. In this pretest, participants saw the picture of the tempting burger (n = 49) 
versus the less tempting burger (n = 46). Subsequently, they were asked how unhealthy they 
thought this hamburger was compared to other foods (1 = not unhealthy at all, 7 = very 
unhealthy). The results showed that eating the tempting burger (M = 5.33, SD = 1.16) and the 
less tempting burger (M = 5.70, SD = 1.19) was regarded equally unhealthy, t(93) = 1.53, p = 




.130, indicating that in both conditions, people realize that eating the burger is a negative action. 
 Five hundred and one U.S. based participants completed our experiment on MTurk. We 
excluded participants who indicated that they were vegetarians (n = 19)3, leaving 482 
participants (310 males and 172 females, Mage = 31.70, SD = 10.91) in our sample. Participants 
were randomly assigned to the Tempting Burger condition (n = 243) or to the Less Tempting 
Burger condition (n = 239) and were exposed to one of the different burgers presented in Figure 
2. Participants were asked to take a close look at the burger and to indicate how tempting they 
this burger was to them (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Participants then read that this burger was 
intended as an indulgence and that the producers of the burger wanted to know for what reasons 
individuals would allow themselves this particular burger (adopted from De Witt-Huberts et al., 
2014). Next, participants were asked to read four ptential reasons for eating the burger, and they 
indicated for each reason whether they thought it was a good reason for them to eat it (1 = not at 
all, 7 = very much). The four reasons were: “Imagine that you had an intense workout at the gym 
today”, “Imagine that it is a Friday afternoon”, “Imagine that you have worked two hours on top 
of your normal working hours”, and “Imagine that you feel very frustrated about a conflict with 
your coworker that happened earlier today”.  
Results 
  Participants in the Tempting Burger condition rated the burger as more tempting (M = 
5.34, SD = 1.61) than participants in the Less Tempting Burger condition (M = 3.14, SD =1.84), 
t(480) = 13.98, p < .001, d = 1.27. The manipulation was intended to be stronger than the one in 
Experiment 1a, which was successful (the manipulation of Experiment 1a had an effect size of d 
= 0.66 on the temptingness measure).  
                                                           
3 When we included participants who indicated that they were vegetarians, we found similar results. 




Means, standard deviations, and statistical comparison of the acceptability of reasons per 
condition are displayed in Table 2. A MANOVA including all reasons demonstrated that 
participants in the Tempting Burger condition thought the reasons were more acceptable reasons 
than participants in the Less Tempting Burger condition did, Wilks λ (4, 477) = 0.89, p < .001, η² 
= .110. When analyzing the univariate results for each reason, we found that participants in the 
Tempting Burger condition regarded each reason as a better reason for consuming the burger 
compared to participants in the Less Tempting Burger condition. If we aggregate the 
acceptability of all four reasons into a general “reason acceptability”-score (α = .84), we see a 
significant effect of condition as well. For each reason (and also if we combine them into one 
measure), the rated temptingness of the burgers strongly predicted reason acceptability (all β’s ≥ 
.42, t’s (480) ≥ 10.41, p’s < .001). 
- INSERT TABLE 2 HERE - 
Discussion 
  Experiment 1b replicated the findings of Experiment 1a in the domain of unhealthy 
snacking. Participants in the Tempting Burger condition thought each of four reasons a better 
reason to indulge, compared to participants in the Less Tempting Burger condition. In addition, 
the results reveal that the more tempting people find a burger, the more acceptable they find 
different reasons to eat this burger.  
  Together, Experiment 1a and 1b show a clear relation between how tempting something 
is and whether a diverse set of reasons to engage in th  behavior are seen as good reasons to do 
so: When an indulgence is more tempting, people find the same reason to give in to that 
temptation more acceptable than when the indulgence is less tempting. Note that in both cases 
participants would realize that their behavior is undesirable: the pretest shows that people think 




both burgers are equally unhealthy. Interestingly, participants judged ostensibly unrelated 
reasons as better reasons for a tempting choice. For example, ‘it is a Friday afternoon’ was 
regarded as a more acceptable reason to consume a burger when this burger looked very 
attractive. This illustrates that even reasons that convey no relevant information are more 
acceptable in front of a temptation. In other words, anything that feels like a justification is used 
to infer that indulgence is acceptable. 
   Experiment 2a. Interpreting one’s own prior good de d as a reason to indulge  
 So far, we only investigated the acceptability of reasons we provided to participants. In 
addition, participants read about the different reasons directly after being exposed to the 
temptation. In Experiment 2a and 2b, we investigate wh ther self-generated reasons prior to 
exposure to a temptation are interpreted differently depending on the temptingness of the 
temptation. Specifically, in Experiment 2a we expected that a recalled prior good deed would be 
seen as a better and more acceptable reason to indulge when the temptation is stronger. Note 
again that this should not matter: although one is maybe more inclined to eat a more tempting 
burger than a non-tempting burger, this does not make a prior good deed (such as donating to 
charity) a better reason to eat the burger.  
 Method 
  Five hundred and one U.S. based participants completed our experiment on MTurk. We 
excluded participants who indicated that they were vegetarian (n = 25)4, leaving 476 participants 
(311 males and 165 females, Mage = 30.96, SD = 10.29) in our sample. Participants were 
randomly assigned to the Tempting Burger condition (n = 234) or to the Less Tempting Burger 
condition (n = 242). Participants read the following instructions: 
                                                           
4 When we included participants who indicated that they were vegetarian, we found similar results. 
 




Think about a recent situation in which you performed a good deed. By a good deed, we 
 mean a situation where you displayed good, moral,  virtuous behavior. Please describe 
  this good deed. 
 
Next, participants saw a picture of either the tempting or the less tempting burger from 
Experiment 1b. Participants were asked to take a close look at the burger and to indicate how 
tempting they thought this burger was (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Participants then read that 
this burger was intended as an indulgence and that the producers of the burger wanted to know 
for what reasons individuals would allow themselves to eat this burger. Next, the good deed that 
the participants previously recalled was displayed on the screen. Participants were asked whether 
they thought their own prior good deed was a good reason to eat the burger (1 = not at all, 7 = 
very much). 
Results and Discussion 
 Participants in the Tempting Burger condition rated the burger as more tempting (M = 
5.45, SD = 1.62) than participants in the Less Tempting Burger condition (M = 2.97, SD = 1.73), 
t(474) = 16.15, p < .001, d = 1.53. Participants in the Tempting Burger condition (M = 3.22, SD 
= 2.05) regarded their own prior good deed as a better reason for eating the burger compared to 
participants in the Less Tempting Burger condition (M = 2.28, SD = 1.69), t(474) = 5.47, p < 
.001, d = 0.50. Like we found before, the more tempting the burger was perceived to be, the 
more someone thought their prior good deed was an acceptable reason to indulge (β = .46, t(474) 
= 11.35, p < .001). 
 These results suggest that even reasons that are generated prior to exposure to the 
temptation can serve as acceptable justifications t ea  the burger, depending on how tempting 
people find this burger. A recalled prior good deed is thus seen as a better reason to indulge 
when a temptation is really tempting, than when it is less tempting.  




Experiment 2b. Interpreting own previous frustration as a reason to indulge  
If ‘any’ reason serves as a license to give in to temptation, we can expect similar effects 
for recalls of prior negative behavior. For example, having a bad day can also serve as a good 
excuse to indulge when something is really tempting (i.e., comfort buying or comfort eating). 
Therefore, in Experiment 2b, we investigate whether recalls of recent frustrations are interpreted 
as being a more acceptable reason to eat the tempting burger. 
 Method 
  Four hundred and eighty seven U.S. based participants completed our experiment on 
MTurk. We excluded participants who indicated that t ey were vegetarian (n = 24)5, leaving 463 
participants (279 males and 184 females, Mage = 31.54, SD = 9.91) in our sample. Participants 
were randomly assigned to the Tempting Burger condition (n = 233) or to the Less Tempting 
Burger condition (n = 230). Participants read the following instructions: 
Think about a recent situation in which you felt very frustrated. Please describe this 
  situation. 
 
Next, participants saw a picture of either the tempting or the less tempting burger from 
Experiment 1b. Participants were asked to take a close look at the burger and to indicate how 
tempting they found this burger (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Participants then read that this 
burger was intended as an indulgence and that the producers of the burger wanted to know for 
what reasons individuals would allow themselves thiparticular burger. Next, the frustration that 
the participants previously recalled was displayed on the screen. Participants were asked whether 
they found their own frustration a good reason to eat the burger (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
                                                           
5 When we included participants who indicated that they were vegetarians, we found similar results. 




Results and discussion 
  Participants in the Tempting Burger condition rated the burger as more tempting (M = 
5.26, SD = 1.72) than participants in the Less Tempting Burger condition (M = 3.10, SD = 1.83), 
t(461) = 13.11, p < .001, d = 1.22. Participants in the Tempting Burger condition (M = 3.11, SD 
= 2.31) regarded their own frustration as a better reasons for eating the burger compared to 
participants in the Less Tempting Burger condition (M = 2.31, SD = 1.83), t(461) = 4.36, p < 
.001, d = 0.41. The more the burger was perceived as tempting, the more someone thought their 
prior frustration was an acceptable reason to indulge (β = .44, t(461) = 10.61, p < .001). 
  These results show that unrelated frustrations ca also serve as justifications to eat the 
burger, depending on how tempting people find this burger. Combined with the results of 
Experiment 2a, these findings support our theorizing that ‘any’ reason can serve as a license to 
indulge when confronted with a temptation. 
Experiment 3. Temptation-based reasoning affects real choice 
 In Experiment 3 we aimed to replicate the earlier findings, with two key changes. First, 
we not only asked whether people found the same reason to be a more acceptable reason for 
indulgence in a tempting situation, but also tested whether it affected actual behavior (a choice of 
an unhealthy donut over an apple). A second addition is that we counterbalanced the order in 
which we asked people to indicate the temptingness of the indulgence, how good the reason is to 
indulge, and the actual choice itself, to control for possible influences from asking one of the 
questions first. 
Method 
 We conducted a pretest to test the stimuli used in this experiment, a choice between a 
donut and an apple. We manipulated the temptingness of the donuts (a choice between four 




donuts from a renowned donut shop presented on a plate versus four donuts bought at a 
supermarket, see Figure 3). We tested how tempting eople thought these donuts were and how 
unhealthy they thought they were (both on a scale from 0 not at all – 6 very much so). Out of 130 
participants, 62 saw a picture of the tempting donuts, 68 of the non-tempting ones. Results show 
that both types of donuts were seen as equally unhealthy, Mtempting = 5.65, SD = 1.31; Mnon-tempting 
= 5.53, SD = 1.13, t(128) = 0.54, p = .589, d = 0.10. There was a clear difference in 
temptingness, Mtempting = 4.95, SD = 1.89; Mnon-tempting = 3.71, SD = 1.71; t(128) = 3.94, p < .001, 
d = 0.69.6 Note that even the less tempting donuts were still seen as quite tempting, with a mean 
level of 3.71 on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 6 (very much). 
 Participants7 (N = 292, 123 male, 169 female, Mage = 20.95, SD = 2.56) were students 
who took part in a series of studies of which ours wa  part (~45 minutes in exchange for 7 euro). 
In between was one study ostensibly on meal boxes that contain ingredients and recipes. We 
asked some questions on their preference for such boxes, but of main interest were questions on 
whether people were hungry at that moment, whether they were dieting (both on scales from 0 
not at all – 6 very much so) and their Body Mass Index (as calculated from their length and 
weight). We did not expect these to have an effect (given the findings in the pretest) but included 
them to explore whether the effects depend on these factors.  
 The main part of the study occurred at the end of the session. When a participant was 
done with the series of experiments, an experimenter led them to a table that contained a plate 
with four donuts and a plate with apples. They were asked to choose between a donut or an 
apple, and answer two final questions: how tempting eating a donut was and whether they 
                                                           
6 Temptingness and perceived healthiness were unrelated to whether someone was dieting, their gender, or age. 
7 The total lab session had 14 more participants, who due to various reasons could not be matched to their scores on 
demographical information, the measures regarding hunger, etc. These were left out of the analyses.  




thought that participating in the set of studies wa a good reason to reward oneself with a donut 
(0 not at all – 6 very much so). The order of these two questions and whether they first answered 
these questions or made the choice was counterbalanced. Participants saw either the donuts that 
the pretest confirmed to be more tempting (N = 148) or the ones that were a bit less tempting (N 
= 144). 
Results 
 Not surprisingly, participants were more likely to choose the donut over the apple when it 
was more tempting (67.6%; 100 out of 148), then when it was less tempting (34.7%; 50 out of 
144), χ2(1, N = 292) = 31.52, p < .001, φ = 0.33. Furthermore, we found that (as the pretest had 
also found) the donuts in the tempting condition were seen as more tempting (M = 4.21, SD = 
1.48) than those in the less tempting condition (M = 3.01, SD = 1.88), t(290) = 6.09, p < .001, d = 
0.71. Furthermore, we also found that people in the more tempting condition thought that having 
participated in the study was a much better reason for i dulgence (M = 3.03, SD = 1.76) than 
those in the less tempting condition (M = 1.67, SD = 1.42), t(290) = 7.25, p < .001, d = 0.85. 
 Our theory started with the idea that more tempting donuts would indeed be seen as more 
tempting, and that with greater temptingness a participant would think that having participated in 
the study was a good reason to indulge, which in tur  would increase the chance of choosing the 
donut. This sequential mediation model (see Figure 4) was tested via the PROCESS macro using 
bootstrapping with 10000 samples (Hayes, 2013). Results indicate that the differences in choices 
for the donut or apple caused by our manipulation of how tempting the donuts were, is no longer 
significant when the perceived temptingness and whether one sees participating in the study as a 
good reason to indulge are added as mediators. Most importantly, the sequential mediation (the 
manipulation affected how tempting the donut was, which affected whether people saw 




participating in the study as a good reason to indulge, which affected whether people chose the 
donut over the apple) was significant (b = 0.14, 95%CI .06 to .27). Furthermore, the indirect 
effect of the manipulation on choice only via how tempting the donut was, was also significant 
(b = 1.03, 95%CI = 0.64 to 1.54), as was the indirect effect only via seeing participating in the 
study as a good reason to indulge (b = 0.44, 95%CI 0.21 to 0.76).  
Note that the order in which the questions on temptingness and the perception that 
participating in the study was a good reason to indulge were answered did not affect the answers 
(nor did the question order interact with the manipulation of temptingness or whether the choice 
was made before or after answering these questions), F’s(3, 282) ≤ 1.72, p’s ≥ .163, η2 ≤ .018. 
The choice itself was also not affected by when it was made, the question order, or by any 
interactions with the manipulation and order effects, Wald-criteria ≤ 2.53, p’s ≥ .112.  
Discussion 
We replicated the previous findings, that when an option is more tempting, people think a 
given reason is a better reason to indulge in the temp ation. In this case, having participated in a 
45 minute lab session (in return for 7 euro) from an objective viewpoint does not seem a better 
reason to eat a tempting donut than a less tempting one, the prior participation is an equally good 
(or bad) reason for both. However, the more tempting people thought the donut was, the better 
they thought that prior participation was a good reason for indulgence, and the more likely they 
became to actually choose the donut over the apple. 
We now also counterbalanced the order in which we ask d the questions. Note that 
theory is clear that the temptingness of a situation affects the interpretation of whether something 
is a good reason for indulgence, which in turn affects the actual choice. However, when someone 
has better reasons to do something they might also be more tempted, but this did not seem to 




matter. Most important is also that we had manipulated the temptingness, providing further 
support for the idea we test here. Finally, some participants made a choice first, before answering 
the questions on temptation (which did not affect the results). This rules out that the effects we 
found are due to a focus we placed on temptations by asking questions about it, as even when we 
asked those questions after the choice was made, we still see a preference for the donut in the 
tempting condition as well as an increase in the perceived temptingness and seeing participation 
in the lab session as a good reason for indulgence in that condition. 
General Discussion 
  We propose a temptation-based reasoning model where t  presence of a temptation 
makes any reason seen as a better reason to give in to the temptation. Our experiments find that 
people think a large variety of reasons for indulgence are more acceptable when they are exposed 
to a tempting situation compared to a less tempting s tuation (Experiment 1a and 1b). In addition, 
our findings show that both recalled prior good deeds (Experiment 2a) and prior frustrations 
(Experiment 2b) are interpreted as better reasons to indulge when confronted with a temptation. 
Finally, we replicate Experiment 2a with a real choi e in Experiment 3: we find that for a more 
tempting donut a research participant thought that helping out with the study was a good reason 
for indulgence, which increased the likelihood that t ey would choose the unhealthy donut over 
eating a healthy apple. The finding that temptations affect the interpretation of different reasons 
for indulgence has important implications for theori s on how people deal with temptations 
(notably self-licensing theory and theories on comfrt buying and eating). We will first discuss 
the importance of our account of temptation-based reasoning, after which we discuss the 
implications of our findings for other theories. 
Temptation-based reasoning 




  The present findings build on theories of motivated reasoning and reason-based choice. 
When people choose an option, they want to be able to support the choice with reasons in favor 
of it (Shafir et al., 1993). Furthermore, if they alre dy prefer one option over the other, they will 
engage in motivated reasoning and are biased towards finding reasons that support their 
preferred option (Kunda, 1990). Indeed, De Witt-Huberts et al. (2014) find that the stronger a 
temptation was, the more reasons they could come up with to support giving in to that 
temptation. Our current work finds that people will even interpret the xact same reason as a 
good or a bad reason for indulgence, depending on how tempted they are by their preferred 
option. For example, our work shows that ‘it is a Tuesday afternoon’ becomes a better reason for 
checking a personal phone at work when checking this p one is more tempting, even though 
from an objective viewpoint this does not seem the best of reasons.  
Sela, Berger, and Liu (2009) found that for difficult choices between utilitarian and 
hedonic goods (for example when choosing from a large ssortment), people have a relative 
preference for the utilitarian goods. The reason for this is that with difficult choices, it becomes 
more important to justify one’s choice and that utilitarian options are usually easier to justify. So 
why does temptation-based reasoning lead to a relativ  preference for a hedonic good in our 
studies, and for a utilitarian product in their studies? First, Sela et al. provided choices between 
for example a more hedonic laptop (designed for fun with high-end graphics, music) or a more 
utilitarian one (designed for work, with extended battery life and business software). The 
hedonic option seems much less of a direct temptation than the stimuli we used in our studies. It 
also seems the case that in their study people are still constructing their preference, while in our 
studies they already have a preference for the temptation which make it more likely that they 
start their search for reasons to justify choosing it. It seems that when there already is an initial 




temptation and thus a preference, motivated reasoning will make one search for reasons to 
support choosing it (De Witt-Huberts, et al., 2014) or make one see any provided or self-
generated reason as a better reason to indulge (our current work). When there is not yet a 
preference, “normal” preference construction occurs, where options that are easier to justify are 
more likely to be selected (leading to a lower prefe nce for hedonic goods for difficult choices, 
see Sela et al.). 
Of course, not all reasons are created equally: although we find that temptation tends to 
make all reasons somewhat more acceptable reasons to indulge, it does not mean that all reasons 
will become acceptable enough to actually act on the indulgence. It may as well be the case that 
the reason “It is Tuesday afternoon” is seen as a better reason when facing a stronger temptation, 
but it might still not be seen as a good enough reason to actually indulge and give in to the 
temptation to actually check the phone. It will still be the case that some reasons are simply 
better than others. Furthermore, past research found that temptations might not only make one 
feel that certain reasons are better ones and thereby facilitate giving in to the temptation, but 
temptations can also activate the long-term goals people have (Fishbach, Friedman, & 
Kruglanski, 2003). For example, Zhang, Huang, and Broniarczyk (2010) found that when people 
have the strong goal to lose weight and are confronted with tempting food, they protected 
themselves by overestimating the amount of calories th  food contained so that they could more 
easily ignore the temptation. Note that in Experiment 3 we did find effects on a real choice, 
showing that this temptation based reasoning can (at least in our study) overcome any 
counterinfluence caused by an activation of the long term goals. Finally, our work also finds the 
temptation-based reasoning regardless of whether we control for people’s diet preferences; 
everyone sees a reason to indulge as a better one, when they are more tempted. 





Self-Licensing. We find that tempting situations make reasons to give in to these 
temptations seem more acceptable. This process can also shed new light on existing theories, one 
of which is self-licensing theory (Miller & Effron, 2010). Various different theories on how the 
licensing process precisely operates exist (see for recent reviews, Blanken, Van de Ven, & 
Zeelenberg, 2015, and Effron & Conway, 2015), but they tend to focus on self-licensing as the 
process in which the initial good act later influenc s people’s behavior. However, if people think 
a reason for indulgence is more compelling when behavior is more tempting, as we propose in 
the current research, licensing theory should in our view also focus on the possibility that it is 
mainly the temptation to engage in undesirable behavior that makes someone look for a 
compelling reason, and in typical licensing studies that might be the good behavior that has just 
been made salient by the set-up of the experiment. As an example of research on licensing, 
Fishbach and Dhar (2005) found that participants who first perceived that they made progress on 
their weight loss objectives were later more likely to choose a chocolate bar over an apple as a 
participation gift. Our findings imply it could also be the case that participants in the Fishbach 
and Dhar study felt tempted to choose a chocolate br over an apple, and that this temptation 
made them see their prior goal progress as an acceptabl  reason to indulge.  
Miller and Effron (2010) argue that self-licensing occurs via one of two processes: the 
prior good deed creates either a credit (something t at can later be used to trade in so one can 
transgress) or serves as a credential (the good deed builds a positive reputation, after which a 
transgressions is seen as less bad because of one’s g od reputation). In both these cases it is the 
prior good deed that builds a credit or a credential, which later allows the transgression. This 
reflects how self-licensing is typically investigated in the lab; people are asked to perform or 




recall a good deed, after which a subsequent less dsirable behavior is (see for often cited 
licensing studies for example Conway & Peetz, 2012; Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011; 
Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). However, it has not explicitly been tested whether the process 
of self-licensing necessarily operates in the order of these two consecutive behaviors. Our results 
(and motivated reasoning theory in general) suggest that the opposite process also works: A 
temptation triggers a search for acceptable reasons to transgress, and a prior good deed is seen as 
an acceptable reason to do so.  
Licensing is often interpreted as a non-conscious process (Khan and Dhar, 2006), where a 
prior good deed boosts one self-view that can in tur influence the likelihood that one engages in 
a subsequent immoral or indulgent action. Our work points to the idea that it might also be a 
relatively more conscious or somewhat deliberative process as well. Furthermore, the process 
proposed by Khan and Dhar implies that a self-boost is needed for licensing to occur, while we 
would predict that also when the past prior good deed does not necessarily makes one really feel 
good about oneself, the prior good deed would make an indulgence more likely. In our 
Experiment 3 people thought that participating in the study in exchange for a monetary reward 
was a better reason to indulge when the temptation was stronger, and in that case the “good 
deed” does not seem one that will actually bolster one’s self-view.  
Our work can also shed light on recent work by Garvey and Bolton (2017), who found 
that after a virtuous act people subsequently perceived the taste of a hedonic product as better, 
but only when they were not really hungry. We would argue that when one is hungry, there 
already is a (relatively) good reason to eat something unhealthy, reducing the conflict of eating it 
and allowing one to savor its taste. When someone is ot hungry, another reason is needed to 
justify eating something unhealthy, and the prior virtuous act can be such a reason. 




 Recent work suggests that the effects of moral licensing (i.e., psychological licensing in 
the moral domain) turn out not to be as robust as previously assumed. For instance, Blanken, 
Van de Ven, Zeelenberg and Meijers (2014) could not replicate the original findings of Sachdeva 
et al. (2009) that writing about one’s positive traits leads to lower donations to charity and 
decreased cooperative behavior in a commons dilemma. In addition, a meta-analysis (Blanken et 
al., 2015) including 91 experimental studies revealed that the average effect size of moral 
licensing is small-to-medium (Cohens d = 0.31). Since our current findings show that 
temptations play an important role in the interpretation of previous behaviors, the licensing effect 
may be stronger and more robust in situations in which the undesirable behavior is more 
tempting.  
Comfort buying and comfort eating. Another domain in which the temptation-based 
reasoning model that we put forward here could be of importance is in comfort buying. Comfort 
buying or retail therapy refers to buying products as a way to alleviate negative moods (e.g., 
Garg & Lerner, 2013; Rick, Pereira, & Burson, 2014). Atalay and Meloy (2011) found that 
negative moods lead to a greater consumption of unplan ed self-treats. If our prediction is 
correct that any reason for indulgence is regarded as more compelling when behavior is more 
tempting, research on comfort buying could also focus on the possibility that perhaps the 
temptation to buy a self-treat makes someone look fr a compelling reason, which could be 
found in the saliency of the current negative mood (e.g., ‘These fabulous shoes are too 
expensive. But I feel sad about failing my exam andthink I deserve a break now and then’).   
  In a similar vein, research on comfort eating – that is, eating to relieve negative emotions 
(Ganley, 1989) – could investigate the possibility that it is mainly the temptation to eat a 
mouthwatering snack that makes someone look for a cmpelling reason. For example, the 




finding that overweight individuals are more likely to overeat when feeling emotionally 
distressed than healthy-weight individuals (Arnow, Kenardy, & Agras, 1991; Baucom & Aiken, 
1981; Chua, Touyz, & Hill, 2004; McKenna, 1972; Sloch wer, Kaplan, & Mann, 1981) may also 
occur if the food is more tempting for overweight individuals, and, as a consequence, feeling 
emotionally distressed might be regarded as a more compelling reason for indulgence by those 
who find that type of food more tempting than others.  
If our findings partially explain comfort buying and eating, interventions that focus on 
restoring someone’s self-esteem or improving someone’s mood (i.e., Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009) 
might not be fully effective for reducing these behaviors when the process we document in the 
current research is at play as well. Improving somene’s mood might just remove the prior 
negative feeling as a reason to indulge, but replac it with a positive mood that could serve as a 
reason to indulge as well. Interventions aimed at for example distracting oneself from the 
temptation might be more effective then (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1993). We do not wish to claim 
that interventions aimed at improving mood or self-esteem do not work, but do think the current 
research helps in identifying boundary conditions in which they are most likely to be effective. 
Conclusion 
The current experiments reveal a temptation-based reasoning process, in which the 
temptingness of the temptation strongly influences how people interpret different reasons for 
indulgence. The contents of these reasons do not seem that relevant: If something is very 
tempting, ‘any’ reason becomes seen as a better reason to give in to temptation. If externally 
provided or self-generated reasons are actually regard d as better reasons to indulge, this could 
have important practical and theoretical implications. For instance, providing in-store 
advertisements with a possible justification could be more effective for more tempting products.   




These findings are not only important for our understanding of how people deal with 
temptations, but also have important implications for other theories. Notably, our findings 
suggest an alternative account of self-licensing where the temptingness of the undesirable 
behavior initiates a search for a license, instead of the previous good behavior making 
subsequent undesirable behaviors more likely. A similar account can be proposed for findings on 
comfort buying and eating, where the temptingness of the indulgence can initiate a search for a 
compelling reason for indulgence.  
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Table 1.  
Effects of a Tempting Phone versus a Less Tempting Phone on whether a specific reason to 
check the phone during work is seen as a good reason to do so 
 Temptingness of Phone    
 Less More    
 n = 237 n = 221    
Reason M (SD) M (SD) F(1, 456) p η² 
You feel very frustrated about 





4.93 .027 .011 
The past few days, you have worked 






0.67 .413 .001 
You performed a good deed earlier 






2.19 .140 .005 
It is a Tuesday afternoon. 2.59 (1.66) 2.99 (1.85) 6.07 .014 .013 
Combined (α = .85) 3.48 (1.42) 3.76 (1.47) 4.41 .036 .010 









Effects of a Tempting Burger versus a Less Tempting Bur er on whether a specific reason to eat 
the burger is seen as a good reason to do so. 
 Temptingness of Burger    
 Less More    
 n = 239 n = 243    
Reason M (SD) M (SD) F (1, 480) p η² 
You had an intense workout at the 
gym today 
3.10 (1.89) 3.98 (1.97) 24.80 <.001 .049 
It is a Friday afternoon 3.23 (1.86) 4.42 (1.88) 49.24 <.001 .093 
You worked two hours on top of 
your normal working hours 
3.63 (1.94) 4.77 (1.78) 45.26 <.001 .086 
You feel very frustrated about a 
conflict with your coworker that 
happened earlier today 
2.67 (1.73) 3.61 (1.94) 31.47 <.001 .062 
Combined (α = .84) 3.16 (1.57) 4.20 (1.43) 57.19 <.001 .106 
Note. Acceptability of the reasons was rated from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).  
  




Figure 1.  
Stimuli used in Experiment 1a 
 
Note. Tempting Phone condition (left) and the Less Tempting Phone condition (right). 




Figure 2.  
Stimuli used in Experiment 1b, 2a, and 2b  
 
Note. Tempting Burger condition (left) and the Less Tempting Burger condition (right) Images 
obtained from http://i.imgur.com/4hIyvq8.jpg?1 and http://i.imgur.com/eW8Z5rJ.jpg. 
  




Figure 3.  
Stimuli used in Experiment 3 
Note. Tempting Donuts (left) and Less Tempting Donuts (right).  




Figure 4. Sequential mediation analysis in Experiment 3 
 
note. Coefficients (SE in italics) with *** are significant at p < .001.  
IV: Donut
0 = less tempting
1= more tempting
Temptation
Prior deed is good 
reason
DV: Choice
0 = apple
1= donut
0.67***
(0.11)
0.28***
(0.05)
0.74***
(0.18)
0.49
(0.32)
1.53***
(0.18)
0.59***
(0.11)
